Dissociating from the Episodic Self: Semantic Memory and its Implications for the Buddhist No-Self Doctrine and Karma
A central tenet to Buddhist theory is the idea of the ‘self’, a concept that has sparked a debate that has spanned centuries. At the heart of this discourse is the Doctrine of the Person or the pudgala — the ‘self’. In one corner, the Pudgalavādins argue that the pudgala is a real concept that, at the same time, operates beyond the linguistic conventions of the self — in short, the truth of the self is that it is ultimately inexpressible. In the opposing corner, Vasubandhu introduced the concept of the no-self in the fourth century, a theory that relies on a doctrine of causal relations that expanded to encompass a debate around the role of episodic memory. Both theories are relevant when considering the relationship between the self, karma and reincarnation. This article considers the implications that certain psychiatric conditions, such as dissociative disorders, have on Buddhist theories of the self when episodic memory is either disrupted or non-existent and how this disparity translates to notions of karma and moral personhood. I argue that the no-self doctrine does not adequately account for a selfhood that exists outside of episodic memory and concludes that the Pudgalavādin idea of selfhood may still hold weight.
I. Pudgalavādins v Vasubandhu
The Pudgalavādins argued that the self is both distinct of and related to the five aggregates positioned in Buddhist texts: form (rupa), sensations (vedana), perceptions (samjna), mental formations (samskara) and consciousness(vijnana). They use the analogy of fire to demonstrate the notion of the self: A flame is neither separate nor the same as the fuel that feeds it. Likewise, the self isn’t reducible to the aggregates, but neither can it exist without them. The Pudgalavā school claimed that there was a lasting self that is intrinsically linked with the continuity of time while also not being eternal (because nothing is eternal); their argument served as an attempt to reconcile the subjective experiences of the past, present and future with the Buddhist teachings of impermanence and no-self (anatta). In short, the Pudgalavādin theory of the self directly contrasts traditional Buddhist reductionism. Instead, it centres on a more nuanced and complex notion of the self and offers us a framework for understanding how the parts of the self (the aggregates) operate to create a unified whole.
In contrast, Vasubandhu refuted the notion of a permanent self and argued that the self is the product of the causal efficacy of the aggregates — –an argument that aligned with Buddhist theories of causation that for a thing to exist in the world, it ought to play a causal role. He supports his argument with the concept of two truths: conventional truth and ultimate truth. The first, he purports, is a mere conceptual construction that exists purely to allow us to function in the world. It is the language we use to give rise to our reality. The second points to the ultimate nature of reality, whereby he argues that the ‘self’ is unreal and exists only within the conventional truth. Last, Vasubandhu reduces the complex phenomena of the self, such as memory, perception and agency, to mere products arising from a series of interconnected and momentary events within a continuum of ever-changing aggregates. In short, the no-self argument is this: the self is a conceptual construction arising from dependently arising episodic memories. Within this argument, the role of causation and memory faces its first challenge.
II. The Episodic Memory Issue
Vasubandhu’s causality theory of memory can best be described as episodic memory, which is the product of interconnected mental events that are causally linked to the experiences that originally gave rise to the creation of those mental events. Episodic memory is, in short, the ability to recall experiences and identify oneself as the object of that memory: “This memory is mine; therefore, I experienced that”. Episodic memory plays a defining role in the debate of the self. While the Pudgalavādins align the concept of the self with the ability to recall experiences across time — thereby giving rise to a sense of continuity, Vasubandhu argues that the self arises from a series of dependently arising mental events — and is therefore not existent in the conventional sense. While Vasubandhu has successfully deconstructed the idea of the episodic self, his argument falls victim to the broadly shared assumption that episodic memory, with its capacity to harbour a first-person perception of the self, is the primary cause for ‘self-ness’.
III. The ‘Thicker’ Sense of Self: Trait Continuity and Semantic Memory
While the ‘no-self’ forms a central tenant of Buddhist thought, episodic memory is the foundation on which Vasubandhu argues that the self is ultimately a conceptual illusion. Nichols contends that the episodic-self only accounts for the ‘thin’ conception of self, a selfhood that is more susceptible to disruption and change throughout one’s lifetime — therefore aligning with Vasubandhu’s fluid notion of the self. The ‘thin’ self is the idea that the traits that one possesses are traits that merely belong to the self, rather than constitute the self. In contrast, the ‘thick’ sense of self is a self that is composed of one’s aspirations, convictions, affections and affiliations — it is a sense of self where traits play a role in the constitution of a person and can be characterised as intangible and highly subjective concepts that are uniquely attributable to each individual. These traits exist across an individual’s lifetime and cannot be attributable to an experience and, therefore, exist outside the realms of episodic memory. In short, the ‘thick’ sense of self is the knowledge of oneself.
For example, I can say that I have always harboured a strong sense of justice as a personal trait. This sense-ness is simply a fact that I know existed before my earliest childhood memories. I cannot attribute this trait as arising from a particular event or series of events — it is just an inherent trait I have possessed throughout my entire lifetime. Therefore, this sense of justice is a fact that forms part of my trait-self, exists independent of my episodic memories, and arises from the realm of semantic memory. Semantic memory is where facts and knowledge of the self are stored without a time stamp. Trait continuity stored in semantic memory supports the idea that a realm of selfhood remains consistent and, unlike episodic experiences, exists independently of the causally dependent restraints central to the Buddhist theory of the self.
To demonstrate the difference between the episodic-self and the trait-self in how the self is conceptualised, consider the following two statements:
1. “I experience a strong sense of justice”
2. “I have a strong sense of justice”.
The first is episodic and implies that this sense-ness is happening to me at that moment in time during the making of that statement and that it is fleeting and subject to change at any moment. The second is based on semantic memory, is factual and implies that it is held and maintains some level of consistency. It is a fact that when I apply it to my episodic memories, it forms the lens through which I respond to and experience the world. It can be applied to episodic memory but can subsequently exist on its own without causation, as it is something that just innately exists within the self at all times. The statement from the trait-self, while simple, communicates what could be considered four natures that embody a person’s selfhood: (i) the value of fairness; (ii) the belief in upholding that value; (iii) the emotional impact of being troubled by injustice and (iv) that this belief operates as an active force that shapes a person’s actions.
The same cannot be said for episodic memories and by extension, the episodic self. In short, semantic memory forms the framework for the trait-self by anchoring us with a sense of personal continuity that can exist both independently and complimentary of episodic memory. Trait continuity founded in semantic memory gives us an alternative foundation for the self that is much more complex and nuanced than the episodic self. The self is not a random jumble of the aggregates but is the specific combination of how the aggregates are bound together in a unique way — the binding that forms this combination of traits, which may be characterised as aggregates, is what constitutes the self. It is this version of the self that has not been adequately considered by Vasubandhu or Buddhist reductionism.
IV. Dissociative Disorders and Fragmented Episodic Memory
A notable theme in Vasubandhu’s argument, which continues throughout other Buddhist writings, is that it assumes that each person maintains a continuous and uninterrupted pattern of linked mental events. Naturally, this raises the question of how the argument for an episodic self holds up when presented with case studies of people whose mental recollections are interrupted or disconnected. Dissociative disorders, which operate as a disconnect between one’s conceptions and experiences, offer a unique challenge to Vasubandhu’s idea of the episodic-self. If the episodic-self, the self reliant on remembering causal events, is an illusion, then how does this self continue if there is no recollection of the causal events?
There are two central dissociation characteristics: the first is depersonalisation, in which a person is no longer aware of their experience, and the second is derealisation, where the external world becomes ‘unreal’. These conditions, while arising from extremely traumatic experiences, are characterised by fragmented episodic memory and a disruption to one’s experiences of the self. The result is that one’s memories are prevented from becoming causally related to the self.
For example, take the case study of RB, a 43-year-old man who experienced significant head trauma after a bicycle accident. After the accident, RB was unable to recall specific events from his past and reported lacking a sense of ownership over his memories. Further, he maintained the ability to recall personal traits and characteristics of his selfhood. RB’s case challenges Vasubandhu’s idea of a causally linked episodic self, as the absence of a feeling of ownership over one’s memories should theoretically result in the absence of a sense of self. This suggests that the self may encompass a broader network of cognitive processes that operate beyond the function of episodic memory.
A second example is the case of Susan Brison, a philosopher who suffered from PTSD after a violent sexual assault. Brison describes experiencing a ‘radical disruption of memory’ and a loss of her episodic sense of self. She reports that there is a severe discontinuation of self between the self that existed before her attack and the self that came into being afterwards. Brison’s reported discontinuation of self presents a crucial paradox through the lens of narrative reconstruction: If an individual’s identity is the mere product of causally linked mental events, how can Brison retroactively influence and recreate her sense of self without these memories? Brison’s disruption of memory and subsequent reconstruction of herself highlights the need to consider the interplay of memory and selfhood in the face of narrative reconstruction and significant episodic memory disruption.
RB and Brison’s cases demonstrate that, even when episodic memory is absent, individuals have reported retaining a sense of self rooted deeply within their personal traits and factual self-knowledge — suggesting that notions of the self are more firmly anchored in semantic memory and are significantly more dynamic than Vasubandhu’s theory allows.
V. The self, moral responsibility and karma
We can establish that both sides agree on the necessity for a chain of causation that establishes the self and all things within the universe as dependently arising, although they differ in their approaches. Vasubandhu argues that any perceived whole ‘self’ is merely an illusion arising from this chain. At the same time, the Pudgalavādins don’t refute the claim for a causal chain; they argue that there is something more to the self and liken the self as the binding agent for aggregates. However, at the heart of this discourse is the question of moral responsibility and karma. If the self does not exist, who carries the karmic seeds within the chain of causation into the next life? The continuity of self is necessary for the moral responsibility of persons as it provides a direct link between karmic actions and their subsequent retribution. If the trait self is the self that continues into our next lifetime, then this provides a direct causal link within the karmic chain of events between this selfhood and the next within the Buddhist cycle of rebirth. If we apply the episodic-self, the link ends when one’s memories end — which often occurs at the end of life. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that a trait-self that exists beyond the restraints of time and episodic events provides a link between this life and any subsequent reincarnations and is the self that is enduring enough to operate as a carrier for karmic seeds. Ultimately, without a clearer idea of what is being reborn in the next stage of rebirth, it is difficult to argue for a no-self view that maintains a moral personhood in the next life. In contrast, the Pudgalavādins theory of the self accommodates notions of karma and its application to both conceptual and ultimate versions of the self in line with Vasubandhu’s doctrine of the two truths.
VI. Conclusion
Vasabandhu’s argument raises questions about the relationship between memory and the self, and by prescribing to Buddhist reductionism, he fails to consider all aspects of personal identity fully and does not sufficiently address the issue of dependently arising karmic consequences when faced with the problem of memory cessation. By centring selfhood in episodic memory alone, Vasubandhu overlooks a sense of self that is deeply rooted in persisting traits and facts of the self tethered to semantic memory. When we consider case studies like dissociative disorders, where the relationship of the self and memories are subject to a fissure, a case emerges for considering an alternative argument that accounts for non-dependently arising notion of the self to explain how the self can continue where a chink in the chain of causation exists. Therefore, where Vasubandhu rejects the Pudgalavādins arguments of the self, ideas of a pudgala that accommodates both self and no-self views ought not to be wholly discounted but should be viewed as complimentary to the Buddhist doctrine of the no-self.
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