The Chicken, the Egg and the Void: Understanding Nāgārjuna’s Theory of Emptiness
‘To say ‘it is’ is to grasp for permanence; to say ‘it is not’ is to adopt the view of nihilism. Therefore a wise person does not say “exists” or “does not exist”’ –MMK 15.10
Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka school of thought offers a solution to the metaphysical understandings of reality that can be analogised with two sides of the same coin. On one side, nihilism argues that nothing exists; on the other, essentialism contends that all things have a fixed state of existence. This essay attempts to explain Nāgārjuna’s middle-way argument which attempts to walks the line between both realms of thought and offers a radical solution: emptiness as dependent origination. It addresses the emptiness of emptiness paradox and concludes that emptiness operates to liberate us from suffering.
II. The chicken, the egg and Nāgārjuna’s emptiness argument
To understand emptiness, we must first understand what it is empty of. In the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna describes a phenomenon whereby all things are in possession of an ‘inherent existence’ or ‘intrinsic nature’. The Sanskrit term for this concept is Svabhāva, and it is svabhāva that Nāgārjuna argues that all things are empty of. There are two conceptual dimensions of svabhāva: an ontological realm, which accounts for the particular way in which objects exist, and a cognitive realm, which enables objects to be conceptualised. Within the ontological dimension, a tripartite understanding of svabhāva emerges: substance, essence and absolute reality.
Substance is central to Nāgārjuna’s argument for emptiness, as it operates as the building block of all independently existing objects that come to be at the endpoint of causally dependent relations. Essence is the property that makes an object what it is; for example, fire is hot, and if it were to stop being hot, it would stop being fire. Last, absolute reality is considered the ‘true’ nature of reality. The absolute reality element of svabhāva results in a contradiction as emptiness is meant to be the ‘true nature’ of reality. The Madhyamaka school of thought offers a way out of this paradox by arguing that the true nature of emptiness (although not dependent on external factors) exists when there is an erroneous conceptualisation of svabhāva. In short, emptiness is not dependent on svabhāva but is the correction of a mistaken view.
However, emptiness does not mean the non-existence of svabhāva. Rather, emptiness is best described as the space between the dependent and causal links that form the chain of reality. This is Nāgārjuna’s ‘middle way’ argument, and it effectively toes the metaphorical line between extreme nihilism, which argues that nothing exists in reality and absolute essentialism, which maintains the view that all phenomena are eternally unchanging and exist independent of other phenomena within reality. Instead, Nāgārjuna relies on the relationship between cause and effect to support his concept of emptiness by arguing that conventional reality results from dependently arising conditions. For example, which came first? The chicken or the egg? Nāgārjuna would say that an egg cannot hatch into a chicken just because it has the ability to, but rather, it requires a combination of conditions to be met first, such as a fertilised yolk (sperm) and warmth. Therefore, the chicken cannot exist on its own without these conditions first having come into existence, which means it does not possess an independent inherent existence — i.e. svabhāva. This absence of an independent existence, that is, the inability for a thing to exist without a causal or dependent relationship to another, is emptiness.
II. Nāgārjuna’s tetralemma
A central tenant of Buddhist metaphysics is the doctrine of causation (pratityasamutpāda), and while ‘causation’ and ‘dependent origination’ are two terms that are often used interchangeably to understand emptiness, Nāgārjuna calls for a more sophisticated understanding of the two. Causation posits an object with inherent power to produce a causation (e.g. the egg cannot hatch itself). In contrast, dependent origination is the phenomenon that arises when two or more things (which are void of inherent causation) are interdependent and operate within a web of conditions. Nāgārjuna challenges the normative understanding of causation by rejecting four premises of causation:
1. Self-causation: Requires something to exist before it can bring itself into existence and is therefore logically unsound;
2. Causation from other things: Implies both cause and effect possess independent existence;
3. Causation from both: This a mistaken reference as it attempts to fuse 1 and 2 together, which have already been refuted; and
4. Causation from neither: Results in the world being arbitrary with no identifiable pattern or reason for existence.
The rejection of causation is what leads us to a more accurate understanding of dependent origination, which highlights both the interdependence and impermanence of all things that operate without the need to possess a permanent and unchanging nature i.e. svabhāva — thus giving us emptiness as the defining truth of all phenomena. Therefore, Nāgārjuna’s argument for recognising the emptiness of all existing things is to overcome attachment and thereby be released from suffering.
III. The emptiness of emptiness paradox
However, emptiness does not equate to non-existence. Instead, it is the idea that phenomena exist in a conventional realm, dependently and in relation to other phenomena. The notion of emptiness is that all things have dependently originated. This is Nāgārjuna’s idea of the ‘ultimate truth’ as it moves beyond the conventional truth of all things having inherent existence that would otherwise be tied to causation. But if the ultimate truth is that emptiness is dependent origination, then from what or how does emptiness dependently arise? As emptiness does not exist of its own, as this would be synonymous with possessing svabhāva, therefore it must have a dependent relation to something. Nāgārjuna argues that this something is emptiness — in short, emptiness dependently arises from emptiness. This emptiness from emptiness paradox is, in his view, how we bridge the gap between conventional and ultimate reality because it avoids creating a false duality between both.
IV. A resigned acceptance of emptiness
But if emptiness is empty, then does nothing matter? The emptiness paradox opens the door for radical nihilism, which could argue that if everything is empty, then we have no reason to work towards liberating ourselves from suffering. This argument would hinge on the incorrect understanding that emptiness equates to a meaningless conventional reality. Emptiness does not render conventional reality useless or meaningless; it merely offers a glimpse beyond the curtain of conventional experiences. However, this brief insight beyond conventional reality can open a philosophical black hole — if dependently originating emptiness arises because of its dependence on other phenomena being empty — where does emptiness begin, if at all? In short, we are left with emptiness analogous to an ouroboros of non-existence.
Paris Masiel, drawing upon Heidegger and Kant, offers an alternative view to conceptualising Nāgārjuna’s position as an anti-position to this ineffable philosophical dilemma and instead directs us towards the embrace of a state of philosophical silence, much like Buddhist notions of nirvana. Masiel argues that emptiness is groundless and ultimately cannot be conceptualised, and it is within this decapsulation of understanding that we ought to find a sense of, albeit resigned, liberation. Because emptiness, although not fully capable of being understood within conceptual reality, nonetheless still allows us to loosen our grip on conventional reality and our illusory notions of permanence and inherent existence.
V. Conclusion
In short, emptiness is neither grounded in existence nor non-existence; it is groundless, and this groundlessness offers a liberating alternative to both essentialist and nihilist understandings of reality.
References
Ames William, ‘The notion of svabhāva in the thought of Candrakīrti’ (1982) 10 Journal of Indian Philosophy 161–177
Bronwyn Finnigan, ‘Madhyamaka Emptiness’ (Lecture, Australian National University, PHIL2012 Buddhist Philosophy, 19th August 2024).
Jan Westerhoff, ‘On the Nihilist Interpretation of Madhyamaka’ (2016) 44 Journal of Indian Philosophy 337–376
Jay Garfield, ‘Introduction to the Commentary’ in The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika (Oxford University Press, 1995)
Jay Garfield, ‘Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness: Why did Nagarjuana start with causation?’ (1994) 44(2) Philosophy East & West
Paris Masiel, ‘Speaking Silently: Nagarjuna and the Paradox of Ultimate Reality (2022) Claremont Colleges Senior Theses 3206
Tom Tillemans, ‘Metaphysics for Mādhyamikas’ in Georges Dreyfus and Sara McClintock (eds), The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference does a Difference make? (Boston, 2003) 93–123
